The documentation of both avio_open() as well as avio_open2() states
that on failure, the pointer to an AVIOContext given to this function
(via a pointer to a pointer to an AVIOContext) will be set to NULL. Yet
it didn't happen upon failure of ffurl_open_whitelist() or when allocating
the internal buffer failed. This commit changes this.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 220846f74f)
The code for GAB2 subtitles predates refcounting AVPackets. So in order
to transfer the ownership of a packet's data pkt->data was simply stored
and the packet zeroed; in the end (i.e. in the read_close-function) this
data was then simply freed with av_freep(). This of course leads to a leak
of an AVBufferRef and an AVBuffer. It has been fixed by keeping and
eventually unreferencing the packet's buf instead.
Additionally, the packet is now reset via av_packet_unref().
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit da44bbefaa)
by changing the type to unsigned.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 8ae026d74f)
Fixes#8314.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Ross <pross@xvid.org>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 373c1c9b69)
The Dash muxer uses submuxers and when one such submuxer has been allocated,
it is initially only stored in a temporary variable. Therefore it leaks
if an error happens between the allocation and storing it permanently.
This commit changes this.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: "Jeyapal, Karthick" <kjeyapal@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 8aeab0dbc1)
by freeing it a bit earlier.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit bb20f3dd73)
A Seek element in a Matroska SeekHead should contain a SeekID and a
SeekPosition element and upon reading, they should be sanitized:
Given that IDs are restricted to 32 bit, longer SeekIDs should be treated
as invalid. Instead currently the lower 32 bits have been used.
For SeekPosition, no checks were performed for the element to be
present and if present, whether it was excessively large (i.e. the
absolute file position described by it exceeding INT64_MAX). The
SeekPosition element had a default value of -1 which means that a check
seems to have been intended; but it was not implemented. This commit adds
a check for overflow to the calculation of the absolute file position of
the referenced level 1 elements.
Using -1 (i.e. UINT64_MAX) as default value for SeekPosition implies that
a Seek element without SeekPosition will run afoul of this check.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7c243eece3)
Matroska (or actually EBML) uses variable-length numbers where only
seven bits of every byte is usable for the length; the other bits encode
the length of the variable-length number. So in order to find out how
many bytes one needs to encode a given number one can use a loop like
while (num >> 7 * bytes) bytes++; the Matroska muxer effectively did this.
Yet it has a disadvantage: It is impossible for the result of a single
right shift of an unsigned number with most significant bit set to be
zero, because one can only shift by 0..(width - 1). On some
architectures like x64 it is not even possible to do it with undefined
right shifts in which case this leads to an infinite loop.
This can be easily avoided by switching to a loop whose condition is
(num >>= 7). The maximum value the so modified function can return
is 10; any value > 8 is invalid and will now lead to an assert in
put_ebml_num() or in start_ebml_master() (or actually in
put_ebml_size_unknown()).
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9b0f9003df)
For FLAC, Speex, Opus and VP8 the Ogg muxer allocates two buffers
for building the headers: The first for extradata in an Ogg-specific
format and the second contains a Vorbiscomment. These buffers are
reachable via pointers in the corresponding AVStream's priv_data.
If an error happens during building the headers, the AVStream's
priv_data would be freed. This is pointless in general as it would be
freed generically anyway, but here it is actively harmful: If the second
of the aforementioned allocations fails, the first buffer would leak
upon freeing priv_data.
This commit stops freeing priv_data manually, which allows the muxer to
properly clean up in the deinit function.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0fcf74f435)
avformat_find_stream_info() may decode some frames to get stream
information. And when it does this for subtitles, the decoded subtitles
leak.
(Decoding subtitles was added in b1511e00f6
for PGS subtitles. When PGS subtitles originate from a container that
exports every segment as a packet of its own, no output will be
generated when decoding a packet, because not enough input is available.
Yet when used with PGS subtitles in the Matroska form a single packet
contains enough data to generate output. Yet said output is not freed,
hence this leak.)
Reviewed-by: Anton Khirnov <anton@khirnov.net>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d026fef999)
vobsub_read_packet() didn't check whether an array of AVPackets was
valid and therefore used uninitialized values.
Reviewed-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit a39536caee)
The WebM DASH Manifest muxer only supports VP8, VP9, Vorbis and Opus,
but there was no check for this. The codec type is used to get a pointer
to a string containing the codec name or NULL if it is not one of those
four codecs. Said pointer has then been used without further checks as
string for the %s conversion specifier in an avio_printf()) call which
is undefined behaviour.
This commit adds a check for the supported codec types.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit cbea58b2b3)
The classical ptr = av_realloc(ptr, size).
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 418e468699)
Do it only if the packet has been successfully allocated in
av_new_packet() -- otherwise on error a completely uninitialized packet
would be unreferenced later.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 6bd8bcc2ac)
The classical ptr = av_realloc(ptr, size), just with av_fast_realloc().
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 5acef12061)
If an AVFormatContext could be allocated, but white-/blacklists couldn't
be copied, the AVFormatContext would leak as it was only accessible
through a local variable that goes out of scope when one goes to fail.
Furthermore, in case writing a header of a submuxer failed, the options
used for said call could leak.
Both of these memleaks have been fixed.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit abbb466368)
Don't read a 64bit number before having checked that the data is at
least 8 bytes long.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 6e9cc96429)
Sometimes it has not been checked whether opening the dynamic buffer for
writing Tags fails; this might have led to segfaults.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit b4f300f8ea)
This is needed especially for AV1: If a reformatting error happens (e.g.
if the length field of an OBU contained in the current packet indicates
that said OBU extends beyond the current packet), the data pointer is
still NULL, yet the size is unchanged, so that writing the data leads
to a segmentation fault.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 58428bef4b)
That way one doesn't have to free later. In this case (concerning TTA
extradata), this also fixes a memleak when the output samplerate is
invalid.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit f7bf59b431)
This avoids accessing an old, no longer valid buffer.
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: crash_audio-2020
Found-by: le wu <shoulewoba@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marton Balint <cus@passwd.hu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit cd74af1416)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
The demuxer code assumes the existence of a video stream
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: 21512/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_DEMUXER_fuzzer-5699660783288320
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 97c78caf3e)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: 8233/PPY6574574605_cut.mp3
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 20f7b4dfc9)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
If the buffer doesn't contain enough bytes when reading a stream,
fail rather than continuing on with initialized data. Caught by
Chromium fuzzeras (crbug.com/1065731).
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 5b967f56b6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Found by Chromium fuzzers (crbug.com/1057205).
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit ad91cf1f2f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
If the buffer doesn't contain enough bytes when reading a stream,
fail rather than continuing on with unitialized data. Caught by
Chromium fuzzers (crbug.com/1054229).
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit b7c67b1ae3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: signed integer overflow: 2 * 1210064928 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Fixes: 20873/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_DEMUXER_fuzzer-5761116909338624
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Anton Khirnov <anton@khirnov.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit c8140fe732)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: memleaks
Fixes: 21084/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_DEMUXER_fuzzer-5655975492321280
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 96c0469455)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: signed integer overflow: 2045163756 * 2 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Fixes: Ticket5132
Found-by: tsmith
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit f3d8f517db)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: signed integer overflow: 0 - -9223372036854775808 cannot be represented in type 'long'
Fixes: Ticket8149
Found-by: Suhwan
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 347920ca21)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
When e2_pts == INT64_MIN and e1_pts >= 0 the calculation of
e2_pts - e1_pts will overflow an int64_t.
Signed-off-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit f15007afa9)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: bypassing of checks and assertion failure
Fixes: asan_1003879.mp4
Found-by: Clusterfuzz + asan
Reported-by: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 1cd4184020)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This reverts commit b71685865f.
The commit lead to the use of an uninitialized variable.
Other issues were listed by Andreas Rheinhardt:
https://ffmpeg.org/pipermail/ffmpeg-devel/2020-March/259150.html
(cherry picked from commit 8b1f07ef51)
In addition, it is not understandable why the patch that neither
claims to fix a regression nor a security issue was backported.
Since commit e134c203 strdups of several elements of a manifest are kept
in the DASHContext; but said commit completely forgot to free these
strings again (with xmlFree()). Given that these strings are never used
at all, this commit closes this leak by reverting said commit.
This reverts commit e134c20374.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3c138e5ceb)
Up until now, writing level 1 elements proceeded as follows: First, the
element id was written to the ordinary output AVIOContext and a dynamic
buffer was opened for the content of the level 1 element in
start_ebml_master_crc32(). Then this buffer was actually used and after it
was closed (in end_ebml_master_crc32()), the size field corresponding to
the buffer's size was written, after which the actual data was written.
This commit changes this: Nothing is written to the main AVIOContext any
more in start_ebml_master_crc32(). end_ebml_master_crc32() now writes
both the id, the length field as well as the data. This is benefical for
streaming, because a client that receives just a Cluster ID and nothing
more might infer that this is EOF; in certain usecases there is also the
danger of a client receiving the Cluster without the actual Cluster ID
at the beginning.
Addresses #8578.
(cherry picked from commit d9c21ec)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Fixes: signed integer overflow: -9223372036854775808 - 17 cannot be represented in type 'long'
Fixes: 18768/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_DEMUXER_fuzzer-5674385247830016
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 7e665e4a81)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
ff_id3v2_parse_priv_dict() uses av_dict_set() with the flags
AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_KEY and AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_VAL. In this case both
key and value are freed on error (and owned by the destination
dictionary on success), so that freeing them again on error is a
double-free and therefore forbidden. But it nevertheless happened.
Fixes CID 1452489 and 1452421.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 67d4940a77)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This avoids problems if the function is called twice
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 13816a1d08)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit d83002179f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
